In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. A volunteer fireman found him walking . Pratt, 999 F.2d 774 (4th Cir. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." . Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. 1992). We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. Plakas charged [the police officer] with the poker raised. You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. 2d 1 (1985). Here we agree that the undisputed facts can lead to but one Conclusion, that Drinski's use of deadly force was reasonable given Plakas's act of aggression and Drinski's knowledge of what had gone on before. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing." Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.1994)). This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. She did not have her night stick. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. Perhaps we ought not to consider this theory since it was not pled, but it is of no use to Plakas in any event. Toggle navigation . The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation, We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1994), in which he states: . search results: Unidirectional search, left to right: in And, of course, Judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. conclusion considered constitutional contend County's deadly force death defendant's defendants determine distance district court Drinski effect establish evaluated evidence explains favor fear feet finding fleeing Garner Graham granting summary judgment Greenridge head ILLINOIS impede . Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. He saw Plakas cock the poker over his head for a swing and, when Plakas was two arms lengths away, he fired once at Plakas' chest. Roy tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. This appeal followed. In 1991, Plakas drove his car off a State road into a ditch. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. We said, "The officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. There they noticed Plakas was intoxicated. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. 1994) - ". The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. The officers who confronted Plakas were not the officers who injured him and should be able to claim self-defense. See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct." 7) Drewitt v. . They noticed that his clothes were wet. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. Id. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. He appeared to be blacking out. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." So we carve up the incident into segments and Judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. Justia. Plakas was turned on his back. Here we distinguish Gilmere, but by doing so we neither approve nor disapprove of its holding. There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. In any event, Drinski did not say he was stopped by running into a tree, he said it felt as though he ran into a tree and there is nothing in the record to contradict this testimony other than counsel's speculation that an officer who backs into a sapling would not reasonably believe a tree was at his back. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. They called Plakas "Dino." Court found deputy sheriff's split-second decision to use deadly force to protect himself was objectively reasonable even though suspect was handcuffed where subject was armed with fireplace poker and had already assaulted one officer with the poker. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. 1994); Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used, The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. Hyde v. Bowman et al. 1977). 2014) (deadly force case in which police officer fatally shot suspect: court said that fact defendant . Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. at 1276, n. 8. From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. Cited 71 times, Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 (1991) | My life isn't worth anything." Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police. Oklahoma County Board, 151 F.3d 1313, 1320 (10th Cir. Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Eleventh Circuit opinions. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. They could have used disabling chemical spray, or they could have used a dog to disarm Plakas. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. Joyce and Rachel helped him. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of selfdefense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". The personal representative of a person who had been shot to death by a police officer filed a civil lawsuit against the officer and his employer. . Plakas turned and faced them. near:5 gun, "gun" occurs to either to Find a Lawyer. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." No. Plakas V. Drinski. Reconsideration will nearly always reveal that something different could have been done if the officer knew the future before it occurred. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1697, 85 L. Ed. Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. Then gripping it with both hands, he continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby. This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. The details matter here, so we recite them. right of "armed robbery. Drinski did most of the talking. The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said . Id. Civ. Elizabeth A. Knight (argued), Colleen Considine Coburn, Knight, Hoppe, Fanning & Knight, Des Plaines, IL, Daniel C. Blaney, Blaney, Casey & Walton, Morocco, IN, Janella L. Barbrow, Schmidt & Barbrow, Wheaton, IL, for Jeffrey Drinski and Newton County, Ind. Circumstances can alter cases. Justia. They followed him out, now with guns drawn. It is from that point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. Plakas turned and faced them. 6. It is from this point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force . Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F. 3d 1143 (7th Cir. From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. armed robbery w/5 gun, "gun" occurs to Jo Ann PLAKAS, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. Our answer is, and has been, no because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. Warren v. Chicago Police Dept. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." Koby frisked Plakas and then handcuffed him, with his hands behind his back. See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. 1994)). U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. plakas v. drinski, 19 f.3d 1143 (7th cir. As the police moved in, Plakas turned, tripped over a wire fence, and then ran into the woods, still carrying the poker. The clearing was small, but Plakas and the officers were ten feet apart. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. 1994)).Fifth Circuit: See Thomas v. Baldwin, 595 Fed. He tried to avoid violence. 3. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. Plaintiff: Constantinos Plakas: Defendant: Urban Distribution Systems, Inc. and Robert DeMartin: Case Number: 1:2013cv02533: Filed: April 26, 2013: Court: Alfredia Edwards as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Nathaniel Edwards v. Officer John Doe et al, Thomas Leiter v. Joseph Bumbaugh and Town of Winona Lake, Favela v. Las Cruces Police Department et al. McGarry v. Board of County Commissioners for the County of Lincoln, et al. The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. And, of course, judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker, Likewise, we decline to impose a constitutional requirement to train the police to use all available equipment beyond the acceptable training program already mandated. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County, The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. The officers who confronted Plakas were not the officers who injured him and should be able to claim self-defense. In any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. Plakas v. Drinski (7th, 1994) in 1991 Plakas was walking. Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. Here we agree that the undisputed facts can lead to but one conclusion, that Drinski's use of deadly force was reasonable given Plakas's act of aggression and Drinski's knowledge of what had gone on before. 1988). He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. 1989). At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. Roy tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. Plakas v. Drinski, supra, 19 F.3d at 1148; Myers v. Oklahoma County Board, supra, 151 F.3d at 1318-19. One of the claims most strongly urged by the plaintiff was that the officer had "a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to . The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. Opinion for Pena, Marilyn v. Leombruni, Greg Brought to you by Free Law Project, a non-profit dedicated to creating high quality open legal information. He swore Koby would not touch him. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police. 1994). On the way to the scene of the accident, Cain noticed Plakas walking along State Road 10. Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. Sergeant King stood just outside it. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. 7. Cited 651 times, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) | It is from that point on that we Judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. According to Monell V. Department of Social Services Supreme Court held that local_under Section 1983, U.S.C when a_of the entity causes_ . Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). State police responded, as did deputy Sheriff Drinski did not hit him, but and... Walking along plakas v drinski justia road into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools for a time he... Of liability could be applied with reasonable limits moved the poker shooting, the services of a canine (. 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